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THE PARSONIAN APPROACH 
TO E C O N O M I C S ’  
I t  is somewhat embarrassing to review a work by a distinguished author whose 
system of thought makes no appeal whatsoever to the reviewer. The senior author 
of the work under review is an eminent Harvard sociologist who is pre-eminently a 
Man with a System. The system is an elaborate taxonomy of social phenomena 
according to a fourfold pattern. It is developed in great detail in Parsons’ earlier 
works-a summary only is provided in the present volume. The system has an 
elaborate terminology of its own, a terminology devised so that practically no word 
in it shall enjoy its common meaning in the English language. It is consequently 
difficult for the reader to follow: learning Parsons is almost like learning a new 
language. The theory is internally coherent, and it is unquestionably one way of 
organising thought about social phenomena. The question is whether it is a useful 
way, and especially whether it is useful enough to warrant the considerable 
expenditure of time and energy which is required to master it. The present volume 
is important because it promises to be in a sense a test case of the Parsonian system. 
The economic system is clearly a sub-system of a larger social system, of which the 
Parsonian theory purports to give an account. The test, therefore, is whether the 
Parsonian system can be applied to the sphere of economics in such a way as to 
yield insights into the operation of the economic system which economics by itself 
cannot provide. This is the task of the present volume. I t  is a congenial one to the 
authors : Parsons himself was originally trained in economics, and his associate, 
Smelser, is a sociologist who has also received training in economics with the 
deliberate end of applying the Parsonian system to economic problems. 
I t  is unfortunately impossible in a brief-or even in an extended review-to 
give any adequate summary of the Parsonian system itself. We can only say here 
that it analyses social life into four parts or aspects, named by the four letters A 
(for Adaptive), G (for Goal-Gratification), I (for Integration) and L (for Latent- 
Pattern Maintenance and Tension Management). In so far as one can identify 
these systems with parts of the social universe, the A-system is best represented by 
the economic system, the G-system by the political system (or, as Parsons calls it, 
the Polity) ; the I-system and the L-system are less easy to identify, but may be 
roughly equated with Religion (sport, morale, ethics, etc.) and with the Household 
or the Social Individual as a “boundary maintaining” system. We must beware, 
however, of identifying the Parsonian dramatispersonae with anything that looks like 
flesh and blood; they are aspects of all organizations, or all concrete realities, and 
no concrete reality can be identified with any one of them. Social action, in the 
Parsonian system, is conceived as something which happens at the boundaries of 
these systems, each of which feed outputs of some sort into the others and receive 
inputs from them. In and around these systems Parsons has developed an elaborate 
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set of conceptual dichotomies of objects, attributes, and hierarchies; the central 
idea of the system seems to be however the generalised notion of exchange as the 
prime mover of social life : everybody does somethingfor something, whether that 
something be a monetary reward, a non-monetary reward like prestige or praise, 
or the fear of some sanction, legal or social. 
The object of the book then is to study the economy as a sub-system of the 
general social system which is especially concerned with the adaptive or ends- 
means relationships of social life, and to examine what exchanges take place 
between the economy, conceived as mainly an A-system, and the other three 
social systems, G, I and L. There seems to me to be a basic misconception here as 
to the nature of economics, indeed as to the nature of theoretical systems. Thus the 
authors say “The peculiarity of economic theory, therefore, is not the separate class 
of variables it employs but theparameters which distinguish the special case or class 
of cases we call economic in the use of the general variables of social theory from 
the other important types of special case” (p. 6). The truth seems to be quite the 
reverse. I t  ispreciscly the separate class of variables which it employs which for the 
economist, at any rate, distinguishes economics from the other sciences. Econo- 
mics studies prices, quantities of commodity exchanged, produced, consumed; 
interest rates, taxes, tariffs: its basic abstraction is that of the commodity. It seeks 
to find reasonably stable relationships among these variables, but it is the variables, 
not the relationships, which delimit the subject matter of the science. This is not to 
deny, of course, that economics can be illuminated by contributions from other 
disciplines. These contributions however consist precisely in admitting new and 
different kinds of variables (status rank, class, power, etc.), not particularly in 
employing new kinds of relationships. This basic difficulty runs all through the 
book, and leads to a cumulating misinterpretation of what economics has to say. 
Thus wealth is “not an inventory of commodities but an instrumentality for 
achieving goals” (p. 24). “Raising the interest rate is a signal that productivity 
must increase at a sufficiently higher rate in order to justify the current level of 
credit: lowering the interest rate encourages enterprise by symbolically communi- 
cating that the rate of productivity increase need not be so high” (p. 75). (This 
is a massive confusion between “returns” and “productivity”.) There is a really 
astonishing misunderstanding of the Keynesian system : the authors seem to 
think that “Keynesian” unemployment is a voluntary withdrawal of labor from 
the market-a supply of labor phenomenon rather than a demand for labor 
phenomenon. One could adduce many more instances. 
A sociologist may perhaps be forgiven for a few misunderstandings of eco- 
nomics: the real test of the system however is the contributions which it makes to 
economics. The test of labor is the baby, and a very substantial baby is promised. 
What we are promised is “determinacy” of the functions which comprise the basic 
relationships of economic theory. These functions, like the consumption function 
and the investment function, for instance, in the Keynesian system, are dis- 
tressingly vague-their exact shape and parameters are not determined by pure 
economics, but it seems as if with some assistance from Parsons’ system we can 
learn their true form! Thus we learn from the examination of the various inputs 
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from the social systems in the family that the consumption function will have a 
kink (p. 225). We do not seem to learn much about the investment function except 
that behavior in the stock market may be due to “deeper drives to deviance in 
individuals, such as unbridled acquisitiveness, sadism, phantasied wish-fulfilment, 
etc.” The mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse, if that. 
I have hardly been able to disguise my opinion that this is not a good book. It 
is not, however, a trivial or unimportant work. It struggles with real problems. 
Occasionally important insights break through from the cumbrous trappings of 
the System, such as, for instance, the point that the credit and banking system 
belong more to the “polity” than to the “economy”. The authors are consci- 
entiously trying to work with an apparatus which they believe is an important 
contribution to the tools of the social scientist. A tool is not to be condemned be- 
cause it breaks once. When, however, it produces as little result as it does in this 
volume, and when, furthermore, it seems to be based on a basic misconception of 
the nature of theoretical systems, one must call the tool itself into question. I t  
would be most unfortunate, moreover, if economists were to become discouraged 
by the meager results of this volume from further interest in the contributions of 
sociological to economic theory. The Parsonian system is not “current sociological 
theory”, as the authors seem to imply. It is a highly special and personal system 
which has rather little influence among American sociologists outside Harvard 
University. Even an unsuccessful attempt at an important task however is praise- 
worthy, and as we come to understand why certain attempts at system-building 
fail where others succeed, we shall lay the foundations for a more successful 
advance towards the integration of the social sciences. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. (U.S.A.) K. E. BOULDINC 
